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Abstract
Since the 1970's, ﬁrms struture have changed to ﬁt the Globalization of the Market. Some ﬁrms
have suﬀered from increased competition, whereas others, generally big ones in the Business to
Consumer sector, have enjoyed a decrease in competition. The market power of ﬁrms can aﬀect
the monetary policy trade-oﬀ between output volatility and price volatility. This trade-oﬀ is
generally studied with the New Keynesian Philips Curve equation, which can be obtained by
assuming Calvo or Rotemberg price setting assumptions. Both can involved a market power
parameter. But the Calvo model fails to predict the increase of price volatility on markets, like
manufactured goods, where competition has deﬁnitively increased. By using the Rotemberg
assumption and modelling ﬁrms according to the Theory of ﬁrm Literature, the model generates
the Great Moderation, only if we assume a global rise of the markup in OECD economies since
the beginning of the 1980's. It also generates two other stylized facts since the beginning of
the 1980's: a rise in wage variability and in labor variability relative to output variability. This
simple model replicates a value of the NKPC quite close from empirical estimations since the
1990's. The model steady state with a higher value of mark-up since 1980 supports the fact
that inequalities are higher since the Great Moderation. To ﬁnish, it gives a simple explanation
for the barely growth of median wage compare to the growth of global productivity.
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1 Introduction
Theory of Firm Literature gives very interesting information about the commun mutation of
the structure of big companies in the OECD economies. During the late 1970's and the 1980's
their governance changed a lot. Until the late 1970's, the "`Ford Shape"' was the most spread
structure of big ﬁrms: they were very vertically integrated and the strategy oriented to quantity
and price priority. But consumers began to ask for more quality and diﬀerentiation. In addition
competition arised because of the steady product market deregulation.
[22] described how the former vertical integrated companies externalized all the activities which
not belonged to their core activites in order to keep the most proﬁtable ones. The horizontal
and vertical networks of ﬁrms was imposed in all activities and sectors were the value added
to output was high, [1]. The horizontal network is very long lasting and, by the way, not very
interesting for our purpose. The most famous model of vertical network is called the "`network
ﬁrm"': a leader ﬁrm runs a range of smaller ones. Generally, the smaller ﬁrms are juridically
and ﬁnancially independant. They work with the leader ﬁrm to gather their special abilities
by contractualizing their relationship, [12],[10], [13]. This new organisation ﬁts both ﬂexibility
and innovation constraints that the global market laid down. Almost every sectors of OECD
economies were aﬀected by this mutation during the 1980's. Running a "`network ﬁrm"' be-
came more and more easier with the improvement of ICT,[10]. The leader ﬁrm runs all the
supply chain, by organising logistics between smaller ﬁrms. The leader ﬁrm is usually in charge
of the R&D activity, the ﬁnal sail activity, the marketing activity, the ﬁnancial activity (like
mergers) and quality control activities for the whole "`network ﬁrm"'. Therefore high-skilled
labor is generally employed in the leader ﬁrm. The average skill of employees in smaller ﬁrms
is lower.
To sum up, the leader ﬁrm aims at improving the productivity of the whole "`network ﬁrm"'
to satisfy the ﬁnal consumer as much as possible in the context of market globalization.
In the Macroeconomics Literature, the globalization of markets is associated with more
competition among ﬁrms, which has improved the welfare of consumers. The pure rents, i.e
the monopoly power which enables ﬁrms to determinate price above the marginal cost, should
have decreased during this period,[24]. However they are unobservable. Some economists have
analysed the evolution of diﬀerent variables which likely aﬀect the pure rents. In [5],the product
market deregulation should be the main cause of the fall in pure rents. First of all, the index of
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barriers to entrepreneurship (a composite of product market regulation) has clearly decreased
in all important OECD economies between 1975 and 1998. The deregulation began in the mid
1980's in Anglo-Saxon countries. Secondly the level of foreign trade has increased which should
generate a greater competition. Thirdly the degree of state ownership of ﬁrms in the business
sector has steadily declined. As a consequence, the authors assessed for a decrease of pure rents
in OECD economies since the late 1970's.
Nevertheless this hypothesis is not always suitable for ﬁrms like leader ﬁrms,[27]. The global-
isation creates greater scale. Multinationals can absorb greater ﬁxed cost, like marketing and
R&D expenditure, to produce diﬀerentiated and more technology intensive products. There-
fore, a national monopoly (oligopoly) has incentives to become a global monopoly (oligopoly),
as it is illustrated in the aeronautic sector by Boeing and Airbus. A lot of high technology
sectors are indeed dominated by a large monopoly or oligopoly (Pharmacy, software, chain
retailling...). [27] argued that globalisation could create less contestable market. Because of
network externality, a multinational ﬁrst entrant can impose its technology to all the market,
which create a private monopoly that could be reinforced by TRIPS, the WTO's intellectual
property rights agreements. [27] ﬁnally pinpointed the incentives for multinational company to
rise private barriers and to shape negative market discrimination.
Moreover two other variables advocate a rise in the rent of leader ﬁrm during this last
3 decades. On the one hand, the number of european and american mergers have largelly
increased. Figure 1 shows the evolution of number of the largest european mergers notiﬁed at
the European Commission. In the United states, the numbers of mergers is at least ten times
bigger, [27].
Figure 1: Numbers of Largest European Mergers between 1990 and 2009
3
On the other hand, the gap between the american consumer price index and the ameri-
can ﬁnished consumer good price index have signiﬁcantly increased since the 1980's, which is
presented Figure 2. Along the supply chain, the leader ﬁrm are generally located at the end,
between producers and ﬁnal consumers, it seems that they have enjoyed an increased mark-up.
But this is not a proof, just a clue for assessing a bigger rent. Indeed, the evolution of the
consumer price index is biaised by the development of services during the period.
Figure 2: Evolution of american cpi and american fcgpi
A puzzle arises when we look at the volatility evolution of producer price index (B2B price)
and consumer price (B2C price) index. After the mid 1980's the volatility of the consumer
price index has decreased, whereas the volatility of diﬀerent price index from the industrial
BtoB sector has suﬀered from an increase. The shows this puzzle for Australia, Canada and
United States. A lack of data before the 1980's makes the comparison impossible for others
OECD economies. According to the data and the methodology used to estimate the evolution
of the price volatility, very diﬀerent values can be obtained. Here I used the growth of the
diﬀerent price index to obtian inﬂation index. Then I compute the moving average of growth
over a period of four years and the gap between the former and the latter. I ﬁnally compute
the standard deviation of the gap to ﬁnd the values in the table.
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Australia 1969-1987 1988-2008
Manufactured Producer price Index 0,00760 0,01184
Consumer Price index 0,00830 0,00534
Canada 1956-1984 1985-2007
Manufactured Producer price Index 0,00839 0,00969
Consumer Price index 0,00524 0,00467
United States 1954-1984 1984-2005
Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials 0,00564 0,00575
Producer Price Index: Industrial Commodities 0,00457 0,00836
Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods 0,00548 0,00584
Consumer Price index 0,00298 0,00251
Sources: St Louis Fed and OECD
Using monthly data from St Louis Fed, between 1950 and 2009, we see that the volatility
of the three producer price index have increased. The volatility of the american intermediate
materials price index was about 0.00564 between 1954 and 1984, whereas it increased to 0.00575
between 1984 and 2005. The volatility of industrial producer price index was 0.00457 and
became 0.00386 during the same period. The volatility of ﬁnished consumer good price index
was 0.00548 during the ﬁrst period and rised to 0.00584 during the second one. Although, the
volatility of consumer price index decreased from 0.00298 to 0.00251. With canadian quaterly
data from the OECD database between 1956 and 2009, we show that the volatility of the
canadian manufactured product price index has doubled, from 0.00839 to 0.00969 , to between
the period 1958-1984 and the period 1985-2007. The Canadian consumer price index grew just
a little bit from 0.00524 to 0.00467 during the same period, which can be considered like a
stagnancy of this volatility. Using Australian quaterly data from the OECD database between
1968 and 2009, we see that the volatility of the australian manufactured product price index
has largely increased, from 0.00760 to 0.01184, between the period 1968-1984 and the period
1985-2008. Althought, the consumer price index only grew from 0.00830 to 0.00584 during the
same periods. Consumer price index are less volatile than producer price index in the three
economies (except in Australia during the ﬁrst period but it changes with the lenght)
Whatever the right magnitude, the decrease of the consumer price index volatility remains
a large concensus among economists as well as the decrease of output volatility in all major
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OECD economies,[6], [28]and [19]. This stylized fact ,usually called the "`Great Moderation"',
is commun to all major OECD economies but with diﬀerent timings and magnitudes,[28]:
Figure 3: The beginning of Great Moderation by country
The New Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC) framework, using consumer price index, eas-
ily illustrates the Great Moderation as a decreasing trade-oﬀ between output volatitlity and
inﬂation volatility for the Monetary Authority, [6].
Figure 4: Evolution of the New Keynesian Philips during the last three decades
The NKPC, using consumer price index, moved from the right to the left. Thus we can
assert that the NKPC using producer price index remained the same or rised its locus: for a
smaller output volatility, the producer price index is more volatile.
Many theories have emerged to explain the Great Moderation. The "Good Luck Theory" about
the smaller shocks in OECD economies convices less and less economists, like [9] or [14] whose
empirical studies led to support explanations about structural changes. We have to notice that
the latter article highlights an increase in the volatitlity of hours worked relative to output
during the Great Moderation. Most of the authors claim for a more trusted monetary policy in
the United States. Unfortunately this cause is not suﬃcient for explaining the English Great
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Moderation, [2].[8] claims for a better stock management thanks to a better use of technology
and Just In Time. A more ﬂexible labor market would have generate the great moderation
according to [20], [19]. The less energy dependancy would explain why the rise in oil price since
2002 didn't create stagﬂation, [21], [23]. To ﬁnish, better credit accessibility could be one of
the causes, [4].
Unfortunately none of these theories is able to explain the puzzle of the increased volatility of
producer price index. The hypothesis of the increased global rent can.
In the next section we will create a NKPC model which account for market power of leader
ﬁrms and smaller ﬁrms according to the Theory of ﬁrms Literature. In the third section we
will replicate the Great Moderation with many other stylised facts only if we assume that the
global rent has increased. We ﬁnaly discuss the simulations and conclude in the last section.
2 The Model
2.1 The failure of the Calvo model
In this paper we will assume as equivalent the pure rent and the mark-up, which determine the
market structure: an increase (decrease) of the mark-up means an fall (rise) in competition. In
[18] the eﬀect of market structure on the slope of the New keynesian Philips Curve is studied.
Since [26], it is well known that the reduced-forms obtained by the Rotemberg,[25] and the
Calvo,[7], price setting assumptions are quite the same. The NKPC reduced-form obtained
from the Calvo assumption is aﬀected by the mark-up, only if we assume a environment of
"`strategic complementary"', [29]. For the latter NKPC reduced-form, an increased competi-
tion among ﬁrms implies a decrease in price variability, whereas for the former, it implies an
increase. Assuming an increase in global competition and using the decreasing consumer price
index volatility, [18] concludes that the Calvo model was more suitable than the Rotemberg
model.
However, services are an important part of the consumption basket but they are not very trad-
able, unlike manufactured goods. Thus, the Globalization has defenitely increased competition
among manufactured product markets, as Chinese impressive development corroborates. But
the variability of producer price index, notably about manufactured products price index, in-
creased a lot during the period of the Great Moderation in Australia, in Canada and in the
7
United States. [18] conclusion is no more suitable, the Rotemberg model is. That's why we
will use it in the following NK model.
2.2 Households
We assume a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived and identical households. The representative house-
hold maximises a discounted sum of expected utilities:
Ωt (j) =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
{
1
1− σC
1−σ
s (j)−
1
1 + ψ
L
1+ψ
s (j)
}
where j ∈ [0; 1], β is the subjective discount factor, Ct (j) =
[∫ 1
0 Ct (j, i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, the Dixit-
Stiglitz constant elasticity-of-substitution-compsumtion index, Ct (j, i) represents consumption
by j of the ith good, Lt (j) is the supply of labour. σ > 0, is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of aggregate expenditure. ψ is the desutility of labour, or the inverse of Frish
elasticity.
The households are limited by the standard budjet contraint:
PtCt (j) +
Bt+1 (j)
(1 + rt)
= Wt (j)Lt (j) + Lhs (j) +Bt (j) + Π
u
t (j) + Π
d
t (j) + Tt (j)
Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ is the price consumer index, Bt (j) is a bond which enable j to save
between to periods. Wt (j) is the nominal wage of j. Lhs (j) is a constant earning from the
downstream ﬁrms to j. Πut (j) denotes the share of proﬁt given to j from the total proﬁt of the
upstream ﬁrms, and Πdt is the same for the downstream ﬁrms. Tt (j) is the cost of changing
price for all the companies which is paid by j. The utility maximising conditions are
Lψt (j) =
Wt (j)
Pt
C−σt (j)
Et
β (Ct+1 (j)
Ct (j)
)−σ
(1 + rt)
 = 1
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2.3 Firms
According to the Theory of ﬁrms Litterature, we try to replicate a simple "`network ﬁrm"'
model with the smaller ﬁrms and the leader ﬁrms. Now the smaller ﬁrms will be represented by
the representative upstream ﬁrm and the leader ﬁrm by the representative downstream ﬁrm.
2.4 The upstream sector
Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate good indexed by h. They are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0; 1]. They operate in a monopolistically competitive market with
the same production function.
Y ut (h) = AtL
α
t (h)
Each ﬁrm faces a demand curve from the downstream sector:
Y ut (h) =
1∫
0
(
P ut (h)
P ut
)−θu
Y dt (i, h) di
with Y dt (i, h) the demand from the downstream ﬁrm i to the upstream ﬁrms h. Y
d
t (i) =[∫ 1
0 Y
u
t (i, h)
θu−1
θu dh
] θu
θu−1
the demand from the downstream ﬁrm i to all the diﬀerentiated up-
stream ﬁrms h, and Y ut (h) =
∫ 0
1 Y
u
t (i, h) di the total output of the downstream ﬁrm h. P
u
t (h) is
the price of the upstream ﬁrm h and P dt (i) the price of the downtream ﬁrm i. 0 < α < 1 is the
elasticity of upstream output with respect to labour. θu is elasticity of demand for downstream
ﬁrm i. We implicitly assume that the capital stock is ﬁrm speciﬁc and constant over time.
2.5 The downstream sector
Each upstream ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good indexed by i. They are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0; 1]. The number of downstream ﬁrm is equal to the number of
upstream ﬁrm. Making the number of downstream ﬁrm smaller would have ﬁtted a real fact,
but it would have made the model more complex without improving the results. They operate
in a monopolistically competitive market with the same production function.
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Yt (i) = A
dY dt (i)
As presented above, the activity of the downstream ﬁrm consists in improving the out-
put of the upstream sector by organising the whole organistion thanks to the development of
marketing, logistics, ﬁnancial and R&D services.
Each ﬁrm faces a demand curve from the ﬁnal consumer:
Yt (i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
with Yt =
[∫ 1
0 Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 for the aggregate demand. Pt (i) is the price of the downstream
ﬁrm i.
2.6 The Rotemberg model
Following [25], each ﬁrm of both sectors faces a quadratic cost of price adjustement, measured
in terms of the ﬁnal good. For uptstream ﬁrms, the cost adjustement is based on real price
because the downstream ﬁrm cares about the real cost variability. Penalties to cover additionnal
management costs of the whole "`network ﬁrm"'can be paid from the upstream ﬁrms to the
downstream ﬁrms.
cu
2
 P
u
t (h)
Pt
pi
Put−1
Pt−1
(h)
− 1

2
Yt
Ad
For the downstream ﬁrms, the cost adjustement is based nominal price,
2.7 The Rotemberg model for the upstream ﬁrms
The representative upstream ﬁrm chooses its real price P
u
t (h)
Pt
at each period to maximise its
proﬁt. Information is not perfect. We assume that upstream ﬁrms cannot forsee the optimal
Put (h)
Pt
. Indeed, in a small ﬁrm the ﬁnancial and accounting departments are more or less devel-
oped and the downstream ﬁrms could whenever change price bargaining conditions by using
their potential greater market power induced by the "`network ﬁrm"' model.
10
P ut (h)MaxΠ
u
t (h) =
Put (h)
Pt
Y ut (h)− Wt(h)Pt Lt (h)− cu2
 Put (h)Pt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
− 1
2 Y ut
which becomes:
P ut (h)MaxΠ
u
t (h) =
(
Put (h)
Pt
)( Put (h)
Pt
Pu
t
Pt
)−θu
Yt
Ad
∫ 1
0
(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−θ
di−( Put (h)Pt
Pu
t
Pt
)−θu
Yt
AdAt
∫ 1
0
(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−θ
di

1
α
Wt(h)
Pt
− cu
2
 Put (h)Pt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
− 1
2 Yt
Ad
The ﬁrst order condition is
(1− θu)
(
Pu∗t (h)
Pt
)−θu(
Pu
t
Pt
)1−θu YtAd − ( YtAdAt)
1
α (− θu
α
) (Pu∗t (h)
Pt
)− θuα −1
(
Pu
t
Pt
)−θu
α
Wt(h)
Pt
−
cu
 Put (h)Pt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
− 1
 Yt
Ad
1
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
= 0
If we log-linearise this equation at the symetric equilibrium:
put − put−1 =
θu − 1
cu
1− α + ψ + σα
α
(yt − ynt ) +−put−1
with
y˜t = yt − ynt
y˜t denotes the global output gap betwenn the ﬁnal output yt and the natural output ynt . p
u
t is
the loglinearized value of the real upstream price.
We will assume that the log-linearised inﬂation rate of upstream prices is
piut = p
u∗
t − pu∗t−1
2.8 The Rotemberg model for the downstream ﬁrms
The core activities of the downstream ﬁrm is the conception, the coordination and the monitor-
ing of the supply chain, [11]. There is no direct link between these three tasks and the quantity
of output. We will then suppose that the cost of (high-skilled) labor in dowstream ﬁrms is
constant. In addition, the downstream ﬁrms have developed their accounting and ﬁnancial
11
departements very well. We then consider that they can determine their next period optimal
price. Given P
u
t (h)
Pt
a downstream ﬁrm chooses a sequence of P dt (i) to maximize the expected
sum of future discounted proﬁts.
P dt (i)MaxΠ
d
t (i) = Et
[∑∞
s=tRt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
Yt+s (i)− P
u
t+s(i)
Pt+s
Y dt+s(i)− cd2
(
P dt+s(i)
piP dt+s−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt+s − Lhs (i)
)]
where Rt+s = βsC−σs is the stochastic discount factor. P
d
t (i) =
[∫ 1
0 P
u
t (h)
1−θudh
] 1
1−θu is the
price index of Y dt (i) the intermediate consumption of i from all upstream ﬁrms. Lhs (i) is
the constant cost of high skilled labor employed by the downstream ﬁrm i whose value makes
Πdt (i) > 0 since big ﬁrms have often given stock dividends to shareholders during the Great
Moderation.
The proﬁt can be written as:
P dt (i)MaxΠ
d
t (i) = Et
∑∞
s=tRt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s(i)− P
u
t+s(i)
Pt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s(i)
Ad
−
cd
2
(
P dt+s(i)
piP dt+s−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt+s − Lhs (i)
The ﬁrst order condition is:
Rt (1− θ) P
d∗−θ
t (i)
P 1−θt
Yt +Rt
Yt
Ad
Put (i)
Pt
θ
P d∗
−θ−1
t (i)
P−θt
−Rtcd
(
P d∗t (i)
piP dt−1(i)
− 1
)
Yt
1
piP dt−1(i)
+
EtRt+1cd
(
P dt+1(i)
piP d∗t (i)
− 1
)
Yt+1
P dt+1(i)
piP d∗2t (i)
= 0
We can easily obtain the downstream price equation:
Pt =
1
θ−1
θ
+ cd
θ
((
pit
pi
− 1
)
pit
pi
+ βEt
C−σt+1
C−σt
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)
pit+1
pi
Yt+1
Yt
) P ut (i)
Ad
= µt
P ut (i)
Ad
where µt is the mark-up over the marginal cost
Put (i)
Ad
. There are two terms in the denominator
of the mark-up. The ﬁrst term, θ
θ−1 represents the standard mark-up and the second term the
cost of adjustment price that it is takes in account.
cd
θ
((
pit
pi
− 1
)
pit
pi
+ βEt
C−σt+1
C−σt
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)
pit+1
pi
Yt+1
Yt
)
represents the net cost associated with price adjusment. When there is no stickiness (c = 0),
12
the mark-up is the same as the desired mark-up, θ
θ−1 .
Log-linearise this last equation gives the NKPC of downstream ﬁrms:
pit =
θ − 1
cd
θu − 1
cu
1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t +
θ − 1
cd
pu∗t−1 + Etβpit+1
2.9 Market structure and the Slope of NKPC
The steady state elasticities of demand for the representative downtream ﬁrm θu, and an up-
stream ﬁrm θ , capture the degree of substituability betwenn their own goods and those of their
competitors. These elasticities are inversely related to the desired mark-up over cost that ﬁrms
want to charge for their output. A higher substituability between goods implies a higher degree
of competition among ﬁrms, and a lower desired mark-up (a reduction in ﬁrm's price power).
A structral increase in competition among ﬁrms is interpreted in terms of a one oﬀ increase in
the (steady state) elasticity.
Within a standard NKPC with Rotemberg price setting assumption, a higher competition
among ﬁrms increases the slope of the Phillips curve and tends to magnify inﬂationnary pres-
sures.Therefore, the market srtucture of the upstream and the downstream ﬁrms aﬀect the
variablility of consumer prices. Actually higher competition makes adjustment price relatively
cheaper (the second term in denominator of µt). For a given magnitude of price adjustement
costscd, a higher θ lowers the net cost associated with adjusting prices. The size of the optimal
price adjustement falls with the increase of competition (as θ increase), which makes price
adjustement relatively cheaper for a ﬁrm when facing quadratic adjustment cost. This eﬀect
promotes price ﬂexibility and increases the slope of the NKPC.
Nevertheless, taking in account Theory of Firms research bring a special NKPC whose slope,
γ is:
γ =
θ − 1
cd
θu − 1
cu
1− α + ψ + σα
α
Here θu, the market structure of B2B ﬁrms, can seriously aﬀect the standard relationship
described above.
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2.10 The Monetary Policy Rule
We will close the model by assuming a very simple monetary policy rule:
rt = φpit
A less simple monetary policy rule is useless ofr the purpose of the paper.
2.11 The Equilibrium
For sequence of productivity shocks {At}∞t=0 a symetric equilibrium is a sequence of quantities:
{Qt}∞t=0 =
{
Yt, Y
n
t , Y˜t, Ct, Lt,Π
d
t ,Π
u
t , Tt
}∞
t=0
that satisfy households and ﬁrm optimality conditions for a given set of prices,
{Pt}∞t=0 = {Wt, P ut , Pt, rt}∞t=0
2.12 The log linearised model around the steady state
Euler equation yt = Etyt+1 − 1σ (rt − Etpit+1)
Work Supply ψlt = wt − σyt
Output yt = at + αlt
Natural output ynt =
ψ+1
1−α+ασ+ψat
Output gap y˜t = yt − ynt
Optimal price for upstream ﬁrms pu∗t =
θu−1
cu
1−α+ψ+σα
α
y˜t + p
u∗
t−1
Inﬂation rate for upstream ﬁrm piut = p
u∗
t − pu∗t−1
New Keynesian Phillips curve for dowstream ﬁrms pit = θ−1cd
θu−1
cu
1−α+ψ+σα
α
y˜t +
θ−1
cd
pu∗t−1 + Etβpit+1
Monetary policy rule rt = φpit
Productivity shock in R&D and managment activities are relatively seldom, that's why
the productivity parameter of downstream ﬁrms is not a big deal. The only shock is on the
productivity parameter of upstream ﬁrms.
at+1 = ρat + t
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avec
0 < ρ < 1
where t is a white noise.
3 Results and simulations
3.1 Results
As explained before, the market structure of the upstream ﬁrms and the downstream ﬁrms
depends on the value of γ :
γ =
θ − 1
cd
θu − 1
cu
1− α + ψ + σα
α
. To study the eﬀect of market strucuture we will suppose that all the parameters remain
constant since the beginning of the 1950's, except θ and θu. θu has deﬁnitively increased with
Globalization: producers in B2B sector have suﬀered from competition of other OECD and
emerging economies. In order to replicate the Great Moderation, i.e a move of the NKPC with
consumer price index from the right to the left, the slope, γ, must decrease. Therefore we have
no choice but to accept the assumption that the global rent have increase during the Great
Moderation. In other words, the downstream elasticity of substitution must have decreased
more than the rise of the uptream elasticity of substitution:
|4θu| < |4θ|
3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated using usual values met in the Literature. The discount facor β = 0.99.
Parameter α = 0.7. Parameterψ = 2 and parameter σ = 2. ρ is calibrated to 0.9. Parameter φ
moves from 1,1 to 2,1. The model is not very sophisticated, that's why in order to meet output
and inﬂation variability values met in [21] we have to use very high value of adjustment price
cost: cu = 500 and cd = 10000.
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3.3 Simulations
To illustrate the market structure of the upstream ﬁrm we will choose θu = 7, before the Great
Moderation and θu = 10 during the Great Moderation. Concerning the downstream sector,
θ = 10 will decrease to θ = 4 during the same periods. The ﬁrst simulation illustrates moves
of the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation volatilities.
Figure 5: Evolution of the NKPC for upstream (ppi) and downstream ﬁrms (cpi) before and
during the Great Moderation
When we compute the value of parameter γ by a simple and linear regression, the theorical
value of the NKPC slope varies around 0.4. The variable x represents the output gap volatility
and the variable y is the consumer inﬂation volatiltity. [18] used a GMM method to estimate
the empirical value of this slope for major OECD countries. He found values from 0 to 0.3
but he added lagged inﬂation and expected inﬂation in his regression. The model is relatively
consistent.
16
Figure 6: NKPC illustration and equation for downstream ﬁrms during the Great Moderation
The next simulation shows a increase of the wage volatility, which is hightlighted in the
empirical studies of [15],[17] but not explained by structural changes. According to the theory
of Permanent Revenue, incentives to smooth consumption by enjoying credit services should
have increased. This theory is consistent with the credit market development in all OECD
countries since the begenning of the 1980's.
Figure 7: Standard deviation of wage for diﬀerent monetary policies
If we make θ decrease from 15 to 2 when θu = 15 and φ = 1.5, the model predicts that
the volatility of employment relative to ouput increases when the gap between upstream and
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downstream elasticities of substitution increases, that is to say if we respect this assumption:
|4θu| < |4θ|
In [14], the standard deviation of worked hours relative to the output one increases too, but
from 0.65 in 1965 to 0.84 in 2005. The simulation generate standard deviations between 2.5
and 6.5. However the labor market is here totally ﬂexible. We can conclude that more the
mark-up of the dowstream ﬁrm is high, higher is the variability of labor relative to output and
higher the incentives to promote ﬂexible labor markets.
Figure 8: Standard deviation of labor relative to the output standard deviation
However the model is weak because it predicts an increase in hours worked volatility, whereas
[14] found a decrease. But two explanations arise about the limits of this model. First the
mutation of big companies structure does not aﬀect the whole OECD economy but only a large
part of it. In the unaﬀected sectors the volatility of worked hours should lead the decreasing
volatility of global output. Secondly the nature of jobs have changed a lot since the late 1970's.
Accounting methods have evolved towards Activity Based Costing, since 1988 [3], which means
that costs are more and more indirect and that hours worked volatility relatively to output
have decreased. The present model just helps to understand why the decreasing volatility of
18
worked hours is less important than the decreasing output volatility.
4 What concequences for an increase of global rent in OECD
economies during the Great Moderation
By using the value of the wage at the steady state, it's possible to calculate its growth according
to both elasticities of substitution:[
δW
δt
W
]
 δ( θθ−1 θuθu−1)δt
( θθ−1
θu
θu−1)
 = −
(
1
AdA
)ψ
α
−
(ψ+1)(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α
(
1
α
)− α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α
(
θ
θ−1
θu
θu−1
)− α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α−1 < 0
Because of the larger decrease of the downstream elasticity of substitution relative to the
increasing upstream one, we ﬁnd a explanation for the barely growth of the median wage
relative to productivity growth during the Great Moderation in the United States and Canada,
[16] Harrisson (2009). The increasing downstream mark-up may slows down the growth of
the wage, the best 1% paid employees wages being incorporated to the proﬁt. The increasing
downstream mark-up is surely related to the increasing inequalities in OECD countries. But
this model can't deal with this issue because we consider identical households. To ﬁnish, the
rise in downstream ﬁrms proﬁt could explain why no stagﬂation arised from recent oil price
shock: greater proﬁt can absorb a more important cost push shock without adjusting price.
5 Conclusion
If ﬁrms use high technology and very costly input, they may have increased their mark-up with
Globalization. More traditionnal ﬁrms, often smaller ones, may have decreased their mark-up.
The Great moderation has structural causes such as market power, which is possible to study
through the reduced form of the NKPC obtained with the Calvo and Rotemberg price setting
assumptions. The Calvo pricing fails to predict the increase of price volatility on BtoB markets
where competition has deﬁnitively increased, notably in the manufactured product sector.
Therefore, we have used a simple New Keynesian model with upstream and downstream ﬁrms,
where both are constraint by the Rotemberg price setting assumption. The only way to replicate
the Great moderation is to assume an increase of the global markup. By our calibration, we
replicate a theorical value of the NKPC close to the ones estimated by [18] for major OECD
19
economies.
Incentives for supporting a more ﬂexible labor market and increasing wage volatility become
endogeneous. A less competetive market gives an explanation of the barely growth of median
wage, compare to the growth of global productivity during the period of the Great Moderation.
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A The Steady State Model
B Derivation of the NKPC under R model
When there is no price stickiness (c=0), both kind of ﬁrms charge its own mark-up over its
current marginal cost
Pt =
θ
θ − 1
P u∗t
Ad
=
θ
θ − 1
1
Ad
θu
θu − 1
1
α
Wt
(
1
At
) 1
α (
Y dt
) 1α−1
Pt =
θ
θ − 1
θu
θu − 1
1
α
(
1
Ad
) 1α+1 ( 1
At
) 1
α
WtY
1
α−1
t
We can compute the steady state values of the model from these equations:
W = LψCσ
Y = AdAL
α
C = Y
1 =
θ
θ − 1
θu
θu − 1
1
α
(
1
Ad
) 1+ψ
α
+1 ( 1
At
) 1+ψ
α
Y
1+ψ
α
+σ−1
t
we easily obtain:
Y = C =
(
θ
θ − 1
θu
θu − 1
1
α
)− α
ψ+ασ+1−α ( 1
AdA
)− (ψ+1)
ψ+ασ+1−α
L =
[(
θ
θ−1
θu
θu−1
1
α
)− α
ψ+ασ+1−α
(
1
AdA
)− (ψ+1)
ψ+ασ+1−α
]
AdA
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W =
(
1
AdA
)ψ
α
−
(ψ+1)(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α
(
θ
θ − 1
θu
θu − 1
1
α
)− α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α
Thanks to the last equation we can calculate the relation between wage growth and global
mark-up:[
δW
δt
W
]
 δ( θθ−1 θuθu−1)δt
( θθ−1
θu
θu−1)
 = −
(
1
AdA
)ψ
α
−
(ψ+1)(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α
(
1
α
)− α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α
(
θ
θ−1
θu
θu−1
)− α(ψα+σ)
ψ+ασ+1−α−1
It's is now easy to ﬁnd the natural output equation:
Y nt =
[
θ − 1
θ
θu − 1
θu
α
(
Ad
) 1+ψ
α
+1
] 1
1+ψ
α +σ−1
(At)
ψ+1
1−α+ασ+ψ
Log-linearising the equation of the natural output gives:
ynt =
ψ + 1
1− α + ασ + ψat
The eﬃcient level of output, in the absence of technology shocks is
Y et = 1
Because T = 0 at the steady state, The log-linearised aggregate ressource constraint with
adjustment price cost is
yt = ct
at the symetric equilibrium the log-linearised marginal cost of upstream ﬁrms is
mcut = wt − at
α
+
(
1
α
− 1
)
yt
which becomes
mcut =
(
1 + ψ
α
)
at +
(
1
α
− 1 + ψ
α
+ σ
)
yt
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Then we easily obtain marginal cost of upstream ﬁrms according to the global output gap:
mcut =
1− α + ψ + σα
α
(yt − ynt )
We can add the equation of the downstream marginal cost:
mct = p
∗u
t
B.1 The upstream ﬁrms
A ﬁrm h chooses P
u
t (h)
Pt
to maximise the proﬁt at each period t without forseeing.
P ut (h)MaxΠ
u
t (h) =
Put (h)
Pt
Y ut (h)− Wt(h)Pt Lt (h)− cu2
 Put (h)Pt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
− 1
2 Y ut
which becomes:
P ut (h)MaxΠ
u
t (h) =
(
Put (h)
Pt
)( Put (h)
Pt
Pu
t
Pt
)−θu
Yt
Ad
∫ 1
0
(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−θ
di−
( Put (h)Pt
Pu
t
Pt
)−θu
Yt
AdAt
∫ 1
0
(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−θ
di

1
α
Wt(h)
Pt
−
cu
2
 Put (h)Pt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
− 1
2 Yt
Ad
The Optimal condition is
(1− θu)
(
Pu∗t (h)
Pt
)−θu(
Pu
t
Pt
)1−θu YtAd − ( YtAdAt)
1
α (− θu
α
) (Pu∗t (h)
Pt
)− θuα −1
(
Pu
t
Pt
)−θu
α
Wt(h)
Pt
−cu
 Put (h)Pt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
− 1
 Yt
Ad
1
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1 (h)
= 0
which becomes at the symetric equilibrium:
cu
θu

 PutPt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1
2 − PutPt
pi
Pu
t−1
Pt−1
 = (1−θu)θu + 1α WtPt ( 1AdAt)
1
α
Y
1
α
−1
t
Loglinearising gives:
cu
θu
(
2
put
pt
− 2p
u
t−1
pt−1
− p
u
t
pt
+
put−1
pt−1
)
=
(θu − 1)
θu
mcut
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and ﬁnally
put − put−1 =
θu − 1
cu
1− α + ψ + σα
α
(yt − ynt ) +−put−1
B.2 The downstream ﬁrms
For downstream ﬁrms, the information is perfect. A ﬁrm i chooses P
d
t (i)
Pt
to maximise the proﬁt
at each period t.
P dt (i)MaxΠ
d
t (i) = Et
[∑∞
s=tRt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
Yt+s (i)− P
u
t+s(i)
Pt+s
Y dt+s(i)− cd2
(
P dt+s(i)
piP dt+s−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt+s − Lhs (i)
)]
which becomes:
P dt (i)MaxΠ
d
t (i) = Et
∑∞
s=tRt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s(i)− P
u
t+s(i)
Pt+s
(
P dt+s(i)
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s(i)
Ad
−
cd
2
(
P dt+s(i)
piP dt+s−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt+s − Lhs (i)
The ﬁrst order condition is:
Rt (1− θ) P
d∗−θ
t (i)
P 1−θt
Yt +Rt
Yt
Ad
Put (i)
Pt
θ
P d∗
−θ−1
t (i)
P−θt
−Rtcd
(
P d∗t (i)
piP dt−1(i)
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)
Yt
1
piP dt−1(i)
+
EtRt+1cd
(
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− 1
)
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P dt+1(i)
piP d∗2t (i)
= 0
then
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Put (i)
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−1
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P−1t
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θ
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P d∗t (i)
piP dt−1(i)
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)
1
piP dt−1(i)
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θ
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At the symetric equilibrium it becomes:
1− θ
θ
+
1
Ad
P ut
Pt
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θ
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)
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+ βEt
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C−σt+1
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(
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or
Pt =
1
θ−1
θ
+ cd
θ
((
pit
pi
− 1
)
pit
pi
+ βEt
C−σt+1
C−σt
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)
pit+1
pi
Yt+1
Yt
) P ut (i)
Ad
= µt
P ut (i)
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Loglinearizing this equation gives:
cd
θ
(pit − βEtpit+1) = (θ − 1)
θ
mct
We ﬁnally obtain:
pit =
θ − 1
cd
θu − 1
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1− α + ψ + σα
α
y˜t +
θ − 1
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pu∗t−1 + Etβpit+1
28
